We address the problem of computing a Walrasian equilibrium price in an ascending auction with gross substitutes valuations. In particular, an auction market is considered where there are multiple differentiated items and each item may have multiple units. Although the ascending auction is known to find an equilibrium price vector in finite time, little is known about its time complexity. The main aim of this paper is to analyze the time complexity of the ascending auction globally and locally, by utilizing the theory of discrete convex analysis. An exact bound on the number of iterations is given in terms of the ℓ∞ distance between the initial price vector and an equilibrium, and an efficient algorithm to update a price vector is designed based on a min-max theorem for submodular function minimization.
Introduction
We study an ascending auction, where given a set of discrete (or indivisible) items, the auctioneer aims to find an efficient allocation of items to bidders as well as market clearing prices of the items (see [5, 6] for surveys). In recent years, there has been a growing use of iterative auctions for items such as spectrum licenses in telecommunication, electrical power, landing slots at airports, etc. In this paper, we consider the setting where there are multiple indivisible items for sale and each item may have multiple units; this is more general than the singleunit setting used extensively in the literature. A fundamental concept in auctions is the Walrasian equilibrium (or competitive equilibrium), which is a pair of a price vector and an allocation of items satisfying a certain property (see below for the precise definition). The main aim of this paper is to analyze the problem of computing a Walrasian equilibrium with respect to the time complexity, by utilizing the theory of discrete convex analysis.
Multi-Item Auction and Walrasian Equilibrium
The auction market model is formulated as follows. In the market, there are n types of items or goods, denoted by N = {1, 2, . . . , n}, and m bidders, denoted by M = {1, 2, . . . , m}. We have u(i) ∈ Z + units available for each item i ∈ N . The case with u(i) = 1 (i ∈ N ) is referred to as the single-unit auction in this paper. We denote the integer interval as [0, u] Z = {x ∈ Z n | 0 ≤ x ≤ u}; note that [0, 1] Z = {0, 1} n . Each vector x ∈ [0, u] Z is often called a bundle; a bundle x corresponds to a (multi)-set of items, where x(i) represents the multiplicity of item i ∈ N . Each bidder j ∈ M has his valuation function f j : [0, u] Z → R; the value f j (x) represents the degree of satisfaction for a bundle x. An allocation of items is defined as a set of bundles x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x m ∈ [0, u] Z satisfying ∑ m j=1 x j = u. In an auction, we want to find an efficient allocation and market clearing prices. Given a price vector p ∈ R n , each bidder j ∈ M wants to have a bundle x which maximizes the value f j (x) − p ⊤ x. For j ∈ M and p ∈ R n , define
We call the function V j : R n → R and the set D j (p) ⊆ [0, u] Z an indirect utility function and a demand set, respectively. On the other hand, the auctioneer wants to find a price vector under which all items are sold. Hence, all of the auctioneer and bidders are happy if we can find a pair of a price vector p * and an allocation x Gross Substitutes Condition and Discrete Concavity We say that function f j satisfies gross substitutes (GS) condition if it satisfies the following:
that x(i) ≤ y(i) (∀i ∈ N with p(i) = q(i)).
This condition means that a bidder still wants to get items that do not change in price after the prices of other items increase. The concept of GS condition is introduced in Kelso and Crawford [12] for a fairly general two-sided job matching model. Since then, this condition has been widely used in various models such as matching, housing, and labor markets (see, e.g., [2, 4-6, 8, 9, 14] ). In particular, Gul and Stacchetti [9] show the existence of a Walrasian equilibrium in a singleunit auction if bidders' valuation functions satisfy the GS condition; they also show that the GS condition is an "almost" necessary condition for the existence of an equilibrium in a single-unit auction.
Various characterizations of GS condition are given in the literature of discrete convex analysis and auction theory [2, 8, 9] . Among others, Fujishige and Yang [8] revealed the relationship between GS condition and discrete concavity called M ♮ -concavity. A valuation function f j : [0, u] Z → R is said to be M ♮ -concave (read "M-natural-concave") if it satisfies the following:
(M ♮ -EXC) ∀x, y ∈ [0, u] Z , ∀i ∈ supp + (x − y), ∃k ∈ supp + (x − y) ∪ {0}:
Here, we denote supp + (x) = {i ∈ N | x(i) > 0}, supp − (x) = {i ∈ N | x(i) < 0} for a vector x ∈ R n , χ i ∈ {0, 1} n is the characteristic vector of i ∈ N , and χ 0 = 0 = (0, 0, . . . , 0).
The concept of M ♮ -concave function is introduced by Murota and Shioura [18] as a class of discrete concave functions (independently of GS condition). It is an extension of the concept of M-concave function introduced by Murota [16] . The concepts of M ♮ -concavity/M-concavity play primary roles in the theory of discrete convex analysis [17] .
It is shown by Fujishige and Yang [8] that GS condition and M ♮ -concavity are equivalent in the case of single-unit auctions.
Theorem 1.1. A valuation function f : {0, 1} n → R defined on 0-1 vectors satisfies the GS condition if and only if it is an M ♮ -concave function.
This result initiated a strong interaction between discrete convex analysis and auction theory; the results obtained in discrete convex analysis are used in auction theory ( [4, 14] , etc.), while auction theory provides discrete convex analysis with interesting applications (see, e.g., [19] ). The GS condition, however, is not sufficient for the existence of an equilibrium in a multi-unit setting. In the last decade, several researchers independently tried to derive conditions for valuation functions to guarantee the existence of an equilibrium in a multi-unit setting (see, e.g., [15, 19] ). Murota and Tamura [19] derive a stronger version of GS condition by using the relationship with M ♮ -concavity, and prove the existence of an equilibrium in a more general setting (see also [17, Ch. 11] ). In this paper, we use the following alternative condition given in [15] , which is obtained by adding to (GS) an extra inequality:
The extra inequality ∑ i∈N x(i) ≥ ∑ i∈N y(i) means that if prices are increased, then a bidder wants less items than before. This condition turns out to be essentially equivalent to M ♮ -concavity (see Theorem 1.4 below), and also to the condition in [19] . Note that for valuation functions on {0, 1} n , the SGS condition is equivalent to the GS condition (see [15] ).
Throughout this paper we assume the following conditions for all bidders' valuation functions f j (j = 1, . . . , m):
The concave-extensibility (A2) is a natural condition for valuation functions [15, 19] ; a valuation function f : [0, u] Z → Z is said to be concave-extensible if there exists a concave functionf defined on {x ∈ R n | 0 ≤ x ≤ u} such thatf (x) = f (x) for every x ∈ [0, u] Z . The assumption (A3) can be removed if we want to compute an ε-approximate equilibrium price vector instead of an "exact" one; for ε > 0, an ε-approximate equilibrium price vector p is defined as a vector such that ∥p−p * ∥ ∞ < ε for some equilibrium price vector p * . For such a problem, all results in this paper can be easily adapted with slight modifications.
Iterative Auctions and Ascending Auctions
The main theme of this paper is the computation of a Walrasian equilibrium in an ascending auction. We focus on an equilibrium price vector p * since an allocation in the equilibrium can be computed efficiently once we obtain p * . In the computation, we assume that bidders' valuation functions f j are given implicitly by so-called demand oracles, i.e., we can get the information about demand set D j (p) for a price vector p, but no information is available about the function values of f j . This assumption is very plausible, since bidders want to preserve their privacy about valuation functions and disclose only the information that is really needed.
In the auction literature an algorithm called the iterative auction (or dynamic auction, Walrasian auction, Walrasian tâtonnement process, etc.) is often used to find an equilibrium [5, 6 ]. An iterative auction computes an equilibrium price vector by iteratively updating a current price vector p by using the information on demand sets D j (p). The most natural and popular iterative auction is the ascending auction, in which the current price vector is increased monotonically. The ascending auction is a natural generalization of the classical English auction for a single item, and known to have various nice properties (see, e.g., [5, 6] ); in particular, it is quite natural from the economic point of view, and easy to understand and implement.
In this paper, we consider the ascending auction 4 presented in Ausubel [1] . This algorithm can be seen as a simplified version of the one in Gul and Stacchetti [10] , where the Lyapunov function defined by
is used. It is known (see [1, 21] ) that p * is an equilibrium price vector if and only if it is a minimizer of the Lyapunov function and that there exists an integral minimizer p * ∈ Z n of the Lyapunov function. Based on this fact, the ascending auction in [1] tries to find a minimizer of the Lyapunov function. For X ⊆ N , we denote by χ X ∈ {0, 1} n the characteristic vector of X.
Algorithm Ascend
Step0:
, then output p and stop. Step3: Set p := p + χ X and go to Step 1.
It can be shown (cf. [1] ) that this algorithm outputs an equilibrium price vector in a finite number of iterations. While the ascending auction has various nice properties (see, e.g., [5, 6] ), it has a disadvantage that the initial price vector must be a lower bound of some equilibrium vector. Taking this into consideration, Ausubel [1] also propose an alternative iterative auction, which allows us to start with an arbitrary price vector, but has a drawback that the change of the price vector is not monotone.
Our Contribution
The main aim of this paper is to theoretically analyze the ascending auction and other iterative auctions with respect to their time complexity. While computational experiments are often used to evaluate the practical performance of iterative auctions (see [3, 20] ), there is no theoretical analysis of the time complexity, even in the case of the single-unit auction, except for the termination in finite time. This paper gives the first theoretical analysis in the case of multi-unit auctions.
The results in this paper consist of the following two:
(i) Tight bounds on the number of iterations of iterative auctions, (ii) An efficient algorithm for the update of a price vector.
Our first result is the analysis of the number of iterations required by the algorithm Ascend. The upper bound established in this paper is useful in practice by providing bidders with an a priori guarantee for the time period of the auction process. The exact bound for the number of iterations in Ascend is given in terms of the distance between the initial price vector and a minimizer of the Lyapunov function L. For the analysis, we definê This result shows that the trajectory of a price vector generated by Ascend is the "shortest" path between the initial vector and a minimizer of the Lyapunov function. This reveals an additional advantage of the ascending auction. We also propose some other iterative auctions in this paper and derive tight bounds for the number of iterations in these algorithms.
Our second result is concerned with the update of a price vector. The algorithm Ascend and other iterative auctions considered in this paper update the price vector by using an optimal solution of the problem min
It is known that these problems can be reduced to submodular function minimization (SFM, for short). Although polynomial-time algorithms are available for SFM [7, 17] , they are quite slow and complicated.
We show that the SFM problems appearing in iterative auctions can be solved more efficiently than by a straightforward application of the existing SFM algorithms. We denote U = ∥u∥ ∞ .
Theorem 1.3. For every integral vector
This improvement is achieved by exploiting the fact that valuation functions are given by demand sets and the submodular functions to be minimized can be represented in terms of demand sets as follows. For
The problem setting of SFM in terms of demand sets is interesting in its own right. Proofs of the results in this paper (given in Appendix) are based on the following equivalence between the SGS condition and M ♮ -concavity. We also point out in Corollary 2.1 that the Lyapunov function has a discrete convexity called L ♮ -convexity. The concepts of M ♮ -concavity and L ♮ -convexity play primary roles in the theory of discrete convex analysis [17] . On the basis of these facts, we can make full use of rich results from discrete convex analysis to prove Theorems 1.2 and 1.3.
Property of Indirect Utility Functions
In this section, we show that the indirect utility function
for every p, q ∈ R n and every nonnegative λ ∈ R + , it holds that
where 1 = (1, 1, . . . , 1) and for p, q ∈ R n the vectors p ∧ q and p ∨ q denote, respectively, the vectors obtained by component-wise minimum and maximum of p and q. It is easy to see that an L ♮ -convex function is a submodular function on R n , i.e., it satisfies
Proof. The assumptions (A1) and (A2) imply the M ♮ -concavity of valuation function f j by Theorem 1.4. Hence, the indirect utility function V j is L ♮ -convex by the conjugacy theorem in discrete convex analysis [17, Ch. 8] .
⊓ ⊔ From this property we obtain the L ♮ -convexity of the Lyapunov function L given by (3) since any linear function is also an L ♮ -convex function and L ♮ -convexity is closed under the addition of functions.
It follows from Corollary 2.1 and the integrality assumption (A3) for valuation functions f j that arg min L is an integral polyhedron by the results in discrete convex analysis [17] . Since arg min L is exactly the same as the set of equilibrium price vectors [1, 21] , this observation implies the known fact that there exists an integral equilibrium price vector.
Analysis for Number of Iterations in Iterative Auctions
In this section, we consider the algorithm Ascend and several other iterative auction algorithms for finding an integral equilibrium price vector, and analyze the number of iterations.
We first show that there exists an integral equilibrium price vector in the
Note thatp can be easily computed from bidders' valuation functions.
Proposition 3.1. There exists an equilibrium price vector p
Hence, the number of iterations of the algorithm Ascend is at most ∑ i∈Np (i). We will see below that the bounds for the number of iterations in Ascend and other iterative auction algorithms are much smaller than ∑ i∈Np (i).
As stated in Theorem 1.2, the number of iterations in Ascend isμ(p • ) + 1. Its proof is quite nontrivial and can be done with the aid of some known results in discrete convex analysis. Note that any algorithm requires at leastμ(p • ) + 1 iterations if it increases the price vector by a 0-1 vector in each iteration. Hence, the algorithm Ascend is the fastest among all iterative auction algorithms of this type, and the trajectory of the price vector is a "shortest" path from the initial vector to an equilibrium. In addition, sinceμ(p
we can guarantee that the algorithm terminates in at most max i∈N {p(i)−p
• (i)}+1 iterations; note that this bound can be computed in advance before executing the algorithm.
Similarly to Ascend, we can consider an algorithm Descend as in [1] , where the price vector is decreased by a vector χ X ∈ {0, 1} n which is a minimizer of L(p − χ X ). It is easy to see that algorithm Descend enjoys similar properties as Ascend. We defině An advantage of algorithms Ascend and Descend is that a price vector is updated monotonically, which is an important property from the viewpoint of auctions. They, however, have a drawback that the initial price vector should be a lower or upper bound for some minimizer of Lyapunov function L. In contrast, the following two algorithms can start from any initial price vector and find an equilibrium. Therefore, the number of iterations can be small if we can choose an initial vector that is close to some minimizer of L.
The next algorithm TwoPhase can be seen as an application of Ascend with an arbitrary initial vector, followed by Descend. The algorithm has a merit that the price vector is updated "almost" monotonically.
Step 0:
Step A1:
, then go to Descending Phase.
Step A3: Set p := p + χ X and go to Step A1. Descending Phase:
Step D1:
, then output p and stop.
Step D3: Set p := p − χ X and go to Step D1.
A version of this algorithm specialized to valuation functions defined on {0, 1}
n coincides with the one in [21] . Another algorithm called "Global Walrasian tâtonnement algorithm" in [1] repeats ascending and descending phases until a minimizer of L is found; our analysis shows that this algorithm terminates after only one ascending phase and only one descending phase.
To analyze the number of iterations required by TwoPhase, we define 
We finally consider the algorithm Greedy, which can be seen as the steepest descent (or greedy) algorithm for the minimization of the Lyapunov function.
Step 3: Set p := p + σχ X and go to Step 1.
This can be seen as an application of the steepest descent algorithm for L ♮ -convex function minimization (see [17] ), for which the number of iterations is analyzed in [13] . We give a refined analysis of this algorithm in terms of the "distance" between the initial vector and a minimizer of L. As mentioned above, any iterative auction algorithm of this type requires at least µ(p • ) + 1 iterations. Theorem 3.3 shows that Greedy is the fastest among all iterative auction algorithms of this type, and the trajectory of a price vector is a "shortest" path from the initial vector to an equilibrium. Although Greedy has such merits in the choice of the initial vector and in the number of iterations, it also has a drawback that it may repeat the increment and decrement of the price vector many times, which is not a desirable behavior from the viewpoint of auction.
It should be noted that the algorithms as well as their analysis in this section can be applied not only to the Lyapunov function but also to any general L ♮ -convex function since our proofs do not rely on any special structure of the Lyapunov function. In particular, the key property used in our proofs is the following property of L ♮ -convex functions.
Proposition 3.2 ([17, Theorem 7.7]). Let
Finally, we point out that in all of the iterative auction algorithms considered in this paper we use linear and anonymous pricing rule, meaning that the price of any bundle x of goods is equal to p ⊤ x and is the same for all bidders. In this case, we need to impose conditions on the valuation of bidders to guarantee that iterative auction algorithms work. On the other hand, so-called combinatorial auction algorithms use nonlinear and discriminatory pricing rule, i.e., the price p(x, i) of a bundle x of goods depends on x and bidder i and is not linear. In this case, iterative auction algorithms work with more general valuation functions, although auction algorithms of this type are difficult to use in practice.
Efficient Update of Price Vector
For an update of the price vector in the ascending auction and other iterative auctions, we repeatedly solve the local optimization problems min X⊆N L(p+χ X ) and min X⊆N L(p−χ X ) for some integral p ∈ Z n , both of which can be reduced to submodular function minimization (SFM, for short). Indeed, the former problem can be reduced to the minimization of a set function given by
which is submodular since the Lyapunov function L is submodular by Corollary 2.1. The latter problem can also be reduced to SFM. In this section, we show that by using demand sets D j (p) obtained from bidders, these problems can be solved faster than a straightforward application of SFM algorithms.
In the following, we consider minimization of ρ L given by (4) . Throughout this section, we assume that for a given integral vector p ∈ Z n and j ∈ M , a vector x • j ∈ D j (p) is available and the membership test in D j (p) can be done in constant time. This means that the evaluation of ρ L (X) requires solving optimization problems on D j (p), which can be done in O(mn 2 log U ) time, where U = ∥u∥ ∞ . Recall that SFM is solvable in polynomial time [7, 17] , provided the function value can be evaluated in polynomial time.
Almost all "combinatorial" polynomial-time algorithms for SFM are based on the following min-max formula (see, e.g., [7, 17] ). For a submodular function ρ : 2 N → Z with ρ(∅) = 0, we define a set
which is called the (integral) base polyhedron associated with ρ.
Proposition 4.1. For an integer-valued submodular function
is an optimal solution of the maximization problem on the right-hand side of (5), then a set X * ⊆ N is a minimizer of ρ if and only
Solving the maximization problem in (5) requires the membership test in B(ρ). For the efficient membership test in B(ρ), the existing polynomial-time algorithms use a technique of representing a vector x as a convex combination of extreme points in B(ρ), which makes the algorithms slow and complicated. The fastest (weakly-)polynomial algorithm runs in O((n 4 EO + n 5 ) log Γ ) time [11] , where Γ is an upper bound on |ρ(X)| and EO denotes the time for function evaluation; Γ = O(mnU ) and EO= O(mn 2 log U ) in our case. We show that the minimization of ρ L can be solved faster by using a representation of the base polyhedron B(ρ L ) in terms of demand sets D j (p).
Proposition 4.2. It holds that
This formula can be proven by using the representation of
Based on this observation, we can prove Theorem 1.3. The established bound O(mn 4 log U log(mnU )) is smaller than the bound O(mn 6 log U log(mnU )) obtained by a straightforward application of the SFM algorithm in [11] .
A Appendix

A.1 Examples of Valuation Functions with SGS Condition
We 
which is called a laminar concave function [17] . Every laminar concave function is an M ♮ -concave function. ⊓ ⊔
Example A.2 (Maximum-weight bipartite matching and its extension).
Consider a complete bipartite graph G with two vertex sets N and J, where N and J correspond to workers and jobs, respectively. We assume that for every (i, v) ∈ N × J, profit w(i, v) ∈ R + can be obtained by assigning worker i to job v. Consider a matching M ⊆ N × J between workers and jobs which maximizes the total profit. Define f : {0,
where ∂ N M denotes the set of vertices in N covered by edges in M . Then, f is an M ♮ -concave function. We consider a more general setting where each i corresponds to a type of workers and there are u(i) ∈ Z + workers of type i. In a similar way as above, we can define a function f :
This f is an M ♮ -concave function. A much more general example of M ♮ -concave functions can be obtained from the maximum-weight network flow problem (see [17] ).
⊓ ⊔
Example A.3 (Quadratic functions). Let
is M ♮ -concave if the matrix A satisfies the following condition:
In particular, a quadratic function f :
This corresponds to a valuation function of a bidder who wants only one item. We can show that f is an M ♮ -concave function [17] . ⊓ ⊔ Example A.5 (Weighted rank functions). Let I ⊆ 2 N be the family of independent sets of a matroid, and w ∈ R n + . Define a function f : {0, 
we define a functionf : {0, 1}Ñ → Z as follows:
It is known that the SGS condition for a concave-extensible function f is equivalent to the GS condition forf . We can also show the following; the proof is rather straightforward from the definition of M ♮ -concavity in Section 2 and therefore omitted. 
is an L ♮ -convex function.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3.1
In the proof of the existence of an equilibrium price in [0, u] Z , we use the following property of M ♮ -concave functions.
Proposition A.4 ([17]). Let
The existence of an integral equilibrium price vector is shown in [1] 
To show that the vector q * is also an equilibrium price vector, we prove that x * j ∈ D j (q * ) holds for all j ∈ M . Claim 1: x * j (i) = 0 for every j ∈ M and i ∈ supp
where the first inequality is by p
and the last inequality by Proposition A.4. Hence, we have 
for every x ∈ [0, u] Z with x(i) > 0. This implies the claim.
[End of Claim 2] Let j ∈ M , and consider the vector y *
, it suffices to show that
holds. By Claims 1 and 2, we have y *
where the right-hand side is nonnegative by x * j ∈ D j (p * ). Hence (8) follows.
A.4 Proof of Theorem 1.2 for Algorithm Ascend
Theorem 1.2 can be proved by using the following property repeatedly.
Proposition A.5. Let p ∈ Z n be a vector withμ(p) > 0, and X ⊆ N be a set that minimizes the value of L(p
Proof. The inequalityμ(p + χ X ) ≥μ(p) − 1 can be shown as follows. By the triangle inequality, we have ∥q − (p + χ X )∥ ∞ ≥ ∥q − p∥ ∞ − 1 for every q ∈ Z n . Taking the minimum over all q ∈ arg min L with q ≥ p + χ X , we obtain
In the following, we show that the reverse inequalityμ(p + χ X ) ≤μ(p) − 1 holds.
Let p * be a vector such that p * ∈ arg min L, p * ≥ p, and ∥p * − p∥ ∞ =μ(p), and assume that p * is minimal among such vectors. We denote
Claim 1: We have A ⊆ X. [Proof of Claim 1] Assume, to the contrary, that
We also have arg max
Hence, Proposition 3.2 implies that
Since p 
where the first equality is by Claim 1.
We next consider the case where the condition p
from which p * + χ B∩X ≥ p + χ X follows. We now show that p * + χ B∩X ∈ arg min L holds. The condition (11) implies
Hence, it follows from Proposition 3.2 that
By the choice of X, we have
Since A ⊆ X \ B by Claim 1 and the definitions of A and B, it holds that
⊓ ⊔
A.5 Proof of Theorem 3.2 for Algorithm TwoPhase
Letp be the price vector at the end of the ascending phase andp be the output of the algorithm. Also, let p * be a minimizer of function L such that
and assume that p * is minimal among such vectors. We now show several lemmas below, from which Theorem 3.2 follows.
the number of iterations in the ascending phase is equal to
Proof. The behavior of the ascending phase is the same as that of the algorithm Ascend applied to the functionL :
Theorem 1.2 implies thatp is a minimizer of the functionL, i.e., 
where X = arg max i∈N {p (13), which, together with (14) , implies
we have
from which follows that
Proof. Let q * be the unique minimal vector in arg min{L
In the following, we prove that ∥q 
. Hence, we may assume that supp
Claim: min i∈X {q
Since
. This inequality and the definition of q * imply that
This, however, is a contradiction to the minimality of q *
[End of Proof of Claim]
Let t ∈ X be an element with q * (t) = p • (t). Then, it holds that
Hence, all the inequalities in this formula hold with equality. In particular, we have max
where the last equality is by supp
for every k ∈ N . Hence, we have 
Proof. We have
where the third inequality is by Lemma A.2 and the definition of p * . ⊓ ⊔ Theorem 3.2 follows from Lemmas A.1, A.2, A.3, and A.4 shown above.
A.6 Proof of Theorem 3.3 for Algorithm Greedy
We first show that the output of algorithm Greedy is indeed a minimizer of the Lyapunov function L.
Proposition A.6 ([17]). Let
Recall that L is an L ♮ -convex function by Corollary 2.1. Since the outputp of the algorithm Greedy satisfies the condition
it is a minimizer of L by Proposition A.6, where the function g is the restriction of L to Z n . The bound µ(p • ) + 1 for the number of iterations in Theorem 3.3 can be obtained by repeated application of the following proposition. The proof is similar to (but more complicated than) that of Proposition A.5 for Ascend.
Proof. We consider the case with σ = +1 since the other case with σ = −1 can be dealt with similarly. For every d ∈ Z n and Y ⊆ N , we have
Hence, it holds that
In the following, we prove that the reverse inequality µ(p+χ X ) ≤ µ(p)−1 holds.
We denote
Let q * be a vector in S with the maximum value of ∥q * − p∥
[Proof of Claim 1] Assume, to the contrary, that q * ≤ p and derive a contradiction. Note that this assumption implies ∥q
, which may be the empty set. Then, we have
which, together with (17), implies
By the choice of σ = +1 and X, we have
since ∥q
By the definition of µ(p), this inequality and the inequaltiy (19) must hold with equality. Hence, we have q * + χ (N \Z)∪X ∈ S and
This, however, is a contradiction to the choice of q * .
[End of Proof of Claim 1]
In the following, we further assume that q * is a minimal vector in the set S with ∥q * − p∥
Note that ξ > 0 by Claim 1.
Claim 2:
We have A ⊆ X.
[Proof of Claim 2] Assume, to the contrary, that A \ X ̸ = ∅ holds. We claim that q
We also have arg max To show the inequality µ(p + χ X ) ≤ µ(p) − 1, we first consider the case with min i∈N {q
We next consider the case with min i∈N {q
Since min i∈N {q 
, where the second equality follows from the definition of B. Hence, it holds that 
we define a set
which is called the (integral) g-polymatroid associated with ρ and ρ ′ (see [A1] ). For j ∈ M and p ∈ Z n , we define set functions η for every X, Y ⊆ N . We next prove the claim (ii) by using the following conjugacy results in discrete convex analysis. In the following, we say that a function g :
for every p, q ∈ Z n and every nonnegative λ ∈ Z + , it holds that
For an integer-valued function g : Z n → Z ∪ {+∞}, we define
which is called the integer subdifferential of g at p.
Proposition A.9 ([17]). Let
is a g-polymatroid given as 
for every p ∈ Z n .
Recall that each f j is an M ♮ -concave function by Theorem 1.4. By Proposition A.10,
is an L ♮ -convex function. Then, by Propositions A.9 and A.11,
is equal to
which is a g-polymatroid. Hence, the claim (ii) holds.
We finally prove the claim (iii). By the claims (i) and ( 
which, together with the definition (3) of the Lyapunov function L, implies Proposition 1.1.
A.8 Algorithms for Demand Sets
We prove the algorithmic properties of demand sets used in Section 4.
Then, D is a g-polymatroid by Proposition A.8 (ii) and its proof. Recall the notation U = ∥u∥ ∞ and the assumption that the membership test in D can be done in constant time.
Proposition A.12. For a given x ∈ D and i, k ∈ N , the values
Proof. Since D is the set of integer vectors in a polyhedron, the values above can be computed by using binary search combined with the membership test in D. Since the values above are nonnegative integers bounded by U , the running time is O(log U ).
⊓ ⊔
LetD ⊆ Z n be the set of minimal vectors in D, which is an integral base polyhedron by Proposition A.8 (iii). Given a vector in D, we can compute a vector inD efficiently.
Proposition A.13. Given a vector x
• ∈ D, a vector inD can be computed in O(n log U ) time.
Proof. A vector inD can be computed by the following algorithm (see, e.g., [7] ):
Step 0: Set x := x • .
Step 1: For i = 1, 2, . . . , n, do the following:
The running time of the algorithm is O(n log U ) by Proposition A.12.
⊓ ⊔
A.10 A Fast Algorithm for Submodular Function Minimization
We present an efficient algorithm for the minimization of the submodular function ρ = ρ L given by (4). Our idea is as follows. As mentioned in Section 4, the existing polynomial-time algorithms use a technique of representing a vector x ∈ B(ρ) as a convex combination of extreme points in B(ρ): • from S to T , and if such a path exists, it updates the flow φ by using a procedure called Augment. If such a path does not exist, then let W be the set of nodes currently reachable from S in G
• . Then, it holds that W ∩ T = ∅. The algorithm tries to enlarge the set W by using a procedure called Double-Exchange, which updates both x and φ as follows.
The procedure Double-Exchange is applied to a triple (j, v, w), where j is an index of the extreme points of B(ρ) in (32) and v, w ∈ N are nodes satisfying v ∈ W , w ∈ N \ W , φ(v, w) > 0, and some additional condition. Such a triple is called an active triple. For the vector y j ∈ B(ρ) and v, w ∈ N , the exchange capacityc(y j , v, w) is given as We note that the proof of the claim (iii) above is based on the following facts.
Proposition A.17 ([A2]).
(i) Double-Exchange(j, v, w) makes an active triple (j, v, w) inactive.
(ii) Between calls to Augment, any inactive triple does not become active.
In our case, the IFF algorithm is modified as follows. As in the original IFF algorithm, the modified algorithm maintains two kinds of variables x and φ, where we employ the representation of x in (33). Then, we do not need the procedure Reduce any more since the number of vectors used in the representation (33) is always the same.
We also modify the procedure Double-Exchange. In the modified algorithm, we call a triple (j, v, w) Proof. The claim (i) follows from the fact that after the call to Double-Exchange(j, v, w) we have either φ(v, w) = 0 orc(y j , v, w) = 0 (or both). To prove (ii), we need an additional rule concerning the order of triples to which Double-Exchange applied: if we apply Double-Exchange to some active triple (j, v, w) for some j ∈ M and v ∈ W , we apply Double-Exchange to active triples (j, v, w ′ ) for all w ′ ∈ N \ W sequentially. Then, triples (j, v, w ′ ) with w ′ ∈ N \ W are now all inactive, and it can be shown that these triples (j, v, w ′ ) cannot become active by the following calls to Double-Exchange, which can be shown by using the fact that the value y j (i) does not increase for i ∈ W and does not decrease for i ∈ N \ W .
⊓ ⊔
Hence, we obtain Theorem 1.3 on the time complexity of the algorithm.
A.11 Ascending Auction for Real-Valued Valuation Functions
We show that a variant of the ascending auction finds an ε-approximate equilibrium price vector in the case of real-valued valuation functions with the SGS condition.
Suppose that for j ∈ M , f j : [0, u] Z → R is a real-valued valuation function with the SGS condition which is concave-extensible. We define the Lyapunov function L : R n → R by (3), which is L ♮ -convex by Corollary 2.1.
We explain how to obtain an ε-approximate equilibrium price vector. Denote ε ′ = ε/n, and define functionL :
and letL Z : Z n → R be the restriction ofL on Z n . Then,L is also an L ♮ -convex function.
By a proximity theorem of L ♮ -convex functions in [A4] , we can show that for every minimizer q ofL Z , there exists a minimizer q * ∈ R n ofL such that ∥q * − q∥ ∞ < n. This fact can be rewritten in terms of the original Lyapunov function as follows: for every q ∈ arg min{L(εq ′ ) | q ′ ∈ Z n }, there exists a minimizer p * ∈ R n of L such that ∥p * − ε ′ q∥ ∞ < ε ′ n = ε. This implies that for every q ∈ arg min{L(εq ′ ) | q ′ ∈ Z n }, the vector ε ′ q is an ε-approximate equilibrium price vector. Since L is L ♮ -convex, the problem min{L(εq ′ ) | q ′ ∈ Z n } can be solved by the following variant of the ascending auction, where each component of p is incremented by ε ′ instead of 1; its validity follows from the previous discussion.
Algorithm ε ′ -Ascend
Step 0: Set p := p
• , where p • ∈ ε ′ · Z n is a lower bound of some p * ∈ arg min L (e.g., p
, then output p and stop. Step3: Set p := p + ε ′ χ X and go to Step 1.
